Dishantra Insights

Society & Everyday Life · Deep explainer

Election Commission of India: Powers, CEC Appointment and Independence

By Dishantra Editorial · Reviewed 6 October 2026

How India’s constitutional election authority works, how appointment and removal rules have changed, what SIR means, and why questions of independence and accountability are under renewed scrutiny.

The short answer

The Election Commission of India (ECI) is not a government department. It is a permanent constitutional body created under Article 324 of the Constitution of India. The Constitution gives it the “superintendence, direction and control” of electoral rolls and elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice-President.

That constitutional position gives the ECI substantial authority, but it does not place the Commission outside the law. Parliament makes election laws; courts can review whether the Commission has acted lawfully; and the ECI itself must operate within constitutional principles, statutes and judicial decisions.

The central question today is therefore not simply whether the Election Commission is “independent” on paper. It is how constitutional design, appointment rules, internal decision-making, electoral-roll management, technology, enforcement and judicial review work together in practice — and whether they generate sufficient public confidence in free and fair elections.

A second point is important at the outset: India does not “elect” the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC). The CEC is appointed. Under the current law, the President formally appoints the CEC and Election Commissioners on the recommendation of a three-member Selection Committee.

1. Why the Election Commission is a constitutional body

Article 324 of the Constitution places responsibility for electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice-President in the Election Commission.

The ECI was established on 25 January 1950. It began as a single-member body headed by the Chief Election Commissioner. Two additional Election Commissioners were appointed briefly in 1989, and the Commission became a continuing three-member body from 1993.

The significance of constitutional status is that the ECI does not derive its existence merely from an ordinary Act of Parliament or an executive notification. Parliament can legislate on elections and on appointments to the Commission, but Article 324 remains the constitutional foundation of the institution.

The Supreme Court has described Article 324 as a broad provision giving the Election Commission responsibility for national and state elections. At the same time, the Court has repeatedly made clear that the Commission cannot act contrary to valid legislation and that its actions remain subject to standards of legality, fairness and judicial review.

2. What the Election Commission actually does

The public usually sees the ECI most clearly when an election schedule is announced. Its work is much broader.

Among its major functions are:

Election administration in India is unusually large. The ECI’s 2024 Lok Sabha election atlas records about 97.98 crore registered electors, more than 10.52 lakh polling stations, and an overall turnout of about 66.1% (excluding the uncontested Surat constituency in the ECI’s turnout table).

Those numbers demonstrate administrative scale. They do not, by themselves, prove fairness. Fairness also depends on who can register, whether rolls are accurate, whether rules are applied consistently, whether polling and counting are verifiable, and whether the institution is sufficiently independent of those contesting for power.

3. How election administration has evolved

India’s election system has changed substantially since the first general election of 1951–52.

From paper ballots to EVMs

Electronic Voting Machines were conceived in the late 1970s and first used on a pilot basis in 1982. Parliament amended the Representation of the People Act in 1988 to provide a legal basis for their use. EVM deployment expanded during the 1990s, and by the 2004 Lok Sabha election, EVMs were used in all 543 parliamentary constituencies.

Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) was introduced after changes to election rules in 2013. VVPAT gives a voter a brief visual confirmation of the candidate selected and creates a paper trail for verification.

In April 2024, the Supreme Court rejected demands to return to paper ballots or require 100% VVPAT counting. It retained the existing framework while adding post-result verification safeguards, including a mechanism under which specified candidates can request technical verification of 5% of EVM units after results.

The Court’s ruling is important for two reasons. It rejected the proposition that suspicion alone was enough to discard the EVM system, but it also recognised that verifiability and procedural safeguards matter to confidence in election results.

From a single commissioner to a collegial commission

The ECI started as a single-member institution. Since 1993 it has operated with a CEC and two Election Commissioners.

The ECI states that all three members have an equal say in decision-making and that decisions are taken by majority where necessary. The CEC is the chairperson, but the office is not designed as a personal command over the other Commissioners.

This collegial structure matters when disagreements arise inside the Commission: the constitutional body is the Commission collectively, not the CEC acting alone.

From paper administration to digital election management

Election administration now uses digital voter services, online applications, electoral-roll databases, results portals, candidate information systems, and tools such as cVIGIL/ECINet for reporting election-code violations.

Technology can increase speed, access and traceability. It can also create new questions about software governance, auditability, cybersecurity, error correction and whether changes to statutory election processes are properly authorised. That makes transparent procedures increasingly important.

4. The Model Code of Conduct: powerful, but different from an ordinary statute

The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is one of the most visible instruments used by the ECI during campaigns.

It evolved from a set of agreed political-party guidelines beginning with Kerala’s 1960 Assembly election and was subsequently expanded nationally. The ECI describes it as a set of norms evolved with political-party consensus.

The MCC applies from the announcement of an election schedule until completion of the election process. It addresses campaign conduct, use of official machinery, meetings, processions, polling-day behaviour, conduct of the party in power and other matters intended to preserve a level playing field.

Some conduct covered by the MCC is also prohibited under statutes such as the Representation of the People Act or other laws. But the MCC itself is not simply another criminal statute. Its effectiveness has historically depended on the Commission’s constitutional authority, rapid intervention, political acceptance and the availability of other legal provisions where applicable.

This creates a recurring test of institutional credibility: rules designed to create a level playing field must be seen to be applied consistently, irrespective of which party or candidate is involved.

5. How is the Chief Election Commissioner appointed today?

This is an area where the system changed significantly in 2023.

What the Constitution says

Article 324(2) says the CEC and other Election Commissioners are appointed by the President, subject to any law Parliament makes on the subject.

For decades, Parliament had not enacted a detailed appointment law. In practice, appointments were made through the executive process.

What the Supreme Court did in 2023

In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2 March 2023), a Constitution Bench addressed this long-standing legislative gap.

Until Parliament enacted a law, the Court directed that appointments should be made on the advice of a committee consisting of:

The Court emphasised the importance of an independent Election Commission to free and fair elections. Crucially, this judicial arrangement was expressly an interim mechanism until Parliament made a law.

What Parliament changed later in 2023

Parliament then enacted the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023.

Under that Act:

  1. A Search Committee, headed by the Union Minister for Law and Justice and including two officials not below Secretary rank, prepares a panel of five names.
  2. A Selection Committee recommends a candidate. It consists of:
    • the Prime Minister — Chairperson;
    • the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha — Member;
    • a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister — Member.
  3. The President formally appoints the CEC or Election Commissioner.

The Selection Committee can also consider a person outside the Search Committee’s five-name panel.

This means the Union executive has two of the three seats on the statutory Selection Committee: the Prime Minister and a Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister. The opposition holds the third seat.

That design is now at the centre of a constitutional debate.

6. Why the appointment process is controversial

The debate is not whether Parliament had power to legislate. Article 324 itself anticipates a parliamentary law.

The disagreement is about whether the particular structure Parliament chose provides sufficient institutional independence.

The criticism

Petitioners challenging the 2023 law argue that replacing the Chief Justice of India on the interim three-person committee with a Union Cabinet Minister gives the government of the day an in-built two-to-one majority in the selection process.

They argue that because the Commission must regulate elections in which the governing party itself is a contestant, the appointment structure should avoid actual or perceived executive dominance.

The Union government’s position

The Union has defended the law. Its argument, as reported during Supreme Court proceedings, is that the Constitution does not require a judge to sit on the appointment panel; judicial representation was an interim arrangement created by the Court until Parliament legislated. The government has also argued that constitutional review should not begin by assuming that a Prime Minister or Cabinet Minister will act in bad faith.

Where the case stands

The constitutional challenge has not been finally decided.

On 23 September 2026, a two-judge Supreme Court Bench delivered differing views on whether the challenge should go to a Constitution Bench. The matter was placed before the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate bench.

Therefore, it would be inaccurate either to say that the current appointment law has been finally invalidated or that its constitutional legitimacy has been conclusively settled.

Current leadership

As of 6 October 2026:

7. What safeguards are meant to protect independence?

Appointment is important, but it is not the only institutional safeguard.

Article 324 gives the CEC stronger removal protection: the CEC cannot be removed except in a manner and on grounds similar to those applicable to a Supreme Court judge. Other Election Commissioners cannot be removed except on the recommendation of the CEC.

The 2023 Act provides a six-year term or service until age 65, whichever is earlier, and bars reappointment.

The Commission is also multi-member, which is intended to prevent the entire constitutional power from resting in one individual. The ECI states that each Commissioner has an equal say.

Courts remain able to review unlawful action. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Article 324 is broad but not arbitrary: the Commission must act within the Constitution and valid election laws.

The institutional question is therefore broader than “Who appoints the CEC?” It includes appointment, tenure, removal, collective decision-making, administrative autonomy, transparency, judicial review and the credibility of procedures.

8. What was the appointment process before the 2023 law?

The pre-2023 system is important because public discussion sometimes assumes that the Supreme Court-created committee had existed for decades. It had not.

Article 324(2) always said that the President appoints the CEC and other Election Commissioners, subject to any law made by Parliament. But for more than seven decades there was no parliamentary law prescribing a selection committee for these appointments. In practice, the President made appointments on the advice of the Union executive. The 1991 Election Commission law dealt with service conditions and transaction of business, not a statutory selection process.

In later decades, the senior-most serving Election Commissioner was commonly elevated to CEC. That was a convention, not a constitutional entitlement. A 2022 Law Ministry press communiqué, for example, expressly described Rajiv Kumar as the senior-most Election Commissioner when appointing him CEC.

Electoral-reform proposals to dilute exclusive executive control are not new. The Dinesh Goswami Committee in 1990 recommended consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of Opposition. A constitutional amendment proposal was later introduced but withdrawn.

The March 2023 Anoop Baranwal judgment then created an interim PM–LoP–CJI committee only until Parliament enacted a law. Parliament’s 2023 Act replaced that interim arrangement with the current statutory system: PM, LoP and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM.

This means the history is best understood in four stages:

  1. 1950–March 2023: President formally appoints; no statutory collegium; executive advice dominates.
  2. March 2023–2024 implementation of the new Act: Supreme Court interim committee of PM, LoP and CJI.
  3. 2023 Act / from February 2024: statutory Search Committee plus Selection Committee of PM, LoP and PM-nominated Cabinet Minister.
  4. 2024–2026: constitutional challenge to the new statutory composition remains unresolved.

The first CEC chosen under the new statutory process

The new statutory process was used in February 2025 to appoint Gyanesh Kumar as CEC. The Selection Committee consisted of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Union Home Minister Amit Shah as the PM-nominated Cabinet Minister, and Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi.

Gandhi submitted a dissent note and asked that the appointment be deferred until the Supreme Court considered the pending challenge to the selection law. The appointment nevertheless proceeded.

For a neutral account, three propositions should remain separate:

9. Section 16: the new statutory protection for CECs and Election Commissioners

The 2023 Act contains another major provision that deserves a separate explanation. Section 16 provides that no court shall entertain or continue civil or criminal proceedings against a person who is or was a CEC or Election Commissioner for an act, thing or word committed, done or spoken while acting, or purporting to act, in discharge of official duty or function.

The protection clause was added through a government amendment during passage of the Bill in the Rajya Sabha. It then became Section 16 of the enacted law.

Three features matter:

That last phrase is legally significant because disputes can arise over whether an allegedly unlawful act was nevertheless performed under colour of office.

Does Section 16 mean that no FIR can ever be filed against the CEC?

It is safer and more accurate not to state it that broadly.

Section 16 does not literally say, “No FIR shall be registered.” Its text bars a court from entertaining or continuing civil or criminal proceedings for the protected category of official or purported-official acts. An FIR is the beginning of a police process, while court proceedings arise later. The exact reach of the provision in a particular criminal allegation can therefore involve questions of statutory interpretation.

What can be said confidently is that Section 16 creates a very strong protection against civil and criminal court proceedings for covered official or purported-official conduct, and the breadth of that protection is itself under constitutional challenge.

In January 2026 the Supreme Court issued notice to the Centre and the ECI on a PIL by Lok Prahari challenging Section 16. The Court did not stay the provision. The challenge remains unresolved.

Is this protection greater than the protection given to the President or the Chief Justice of India?

The comparison is more nuanced than the claim that “not even the President or CJI has such immunity.”

There is, however, an important textual difference: Section 3(2) of the Judges (Protection) Act expressly preserves the power of the Central Government, State Government, Supreme Court, High Court or another competent authority to take action permitted by law. Section 16 of the CEC/EC Act does not use exactly the same saving-clause structure.

The better question is therefore not “who has more immunity?” in the abstract, but what conduct is protected, for how long, against which proceedings, and what accountability routes remain open.

10. How can the CEC be removed? “Impeachment” versus the constitutional wording

Public debate often calls removal of a CEC “impeachment”, but the constitutional language is different from impeachment of the President.

Article 324(5) says that the CEC cannot be removed except in like manner and on like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court. Section 11(2) of the 2023 Act repeats that rule.

For a Supreme Court judge, Article 124(4) requires proved misbehaviour or incapacity and an address by each House of Parliament supported by:

The removal process used for the CEC follows the judge-removal framework under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968:

  1. At least 100 Lok Sabha MPs or 50 Rajya Sabha MPs sign a notice of motion.
  2. The Speaker or Rajya Sabha Chairman may admit or refuse the motion.
  3. If admitted, a three-member inquiry committee investigates the allegations.
  4. If the committee finds misbehaviour or incapacity, the motion can proceed.
  5. Both Houses must pass the removal address with the constitutional special majority.
  6. The President formally issues the removal order.

This high threshold is intended to protect the CEC from easy political dismissal.

Did the 2023 Act change the CEC’s removal safeguard?

No in its core constitutional form. The strong CEC removal safeguard already existed in Article 324(5). The 2023 Act did not make the CEC removable by an ordinary government decision. Section 11(2) essentially restates the constitutional protection.

For the other Election Commissioners, the Constitution provides a different safeguard: they cannot be removed except on the recommendation of the CEC. Section 11(3) of the 2023 Act repeats that position.

Thus, the most significant 2023 changes concern the statutory appointment process, qualifications/tenure framework, transaction of business and Section 16 protection — not an easier removal route for the CEC.

Removal attempts against the current CEC in 2026

The current CEC has already faced formal parliamentary removal attempts.

In March 2026, opposition MPs submitted notices seeking Gyanesh Kumar’s removal. The Lok Sabha notice was signed by 130 MPs and a parallel Rajya Sabha notice by 63 MPs. The allegations included partisan/discriminatory conduct and issues linked to SIR and alleged electoral irregularities.

On 6 April 2026, the Lok Sabha Speaker and Rajya Sabha Chairman refused to admit the notices. The Lok Sabha Secretariat formally recorded that the Speaker had considered the notice and refused admission under the Judges (Inquiry) Act framework.

Later in April, 73 opposition Rajya Sabha MPs submitted a fresh removal notice listing new allegations. The filing of a removal notice does not prove the allegations; it is a constitutional/political process whose first gate is admission by the presiding officer.

11. Is the Election Commission fair?

There is no responsible factual answer that reduces this to a single “yes” or “no”.

A useful assessment has to separate at least three questions.

A. Does India have institutional safeguards for electoral fairness?

Yes. These include constitutional status for the ECI, a multi-member Commission, legal election procedures, observers, party/candidate agents, EVM/VVPAT protocols, judicial review, claims-and-objections procedures for electoral rolls, candidate and expenditure rules, and the Model Code of Conduct.

B. Does the existence of safeguards prove that every ECI decision is fair?

No. A constitutional institution can have strong safeguards and still make decisions that are challenged, reversed or criticised. Courts exist partly because legality must be reviewable.

C. Are current allegations against the ECI proven?

Not merely because they are politically serious or widely repeated.

The right approach is to distinguish:

That distinction is particularly important in 2026.

What is SIR, and why has it become politically important?

SIR means Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls. In simple terms, it is a deeper re-verification of the voter list than the routine summary revision used to add new voters, correct entries and remove people who have died or permanently shifted.

The Election Commission — not the Union government — formally directs SIR under the election-law framework. The Commission’s stated purpose is to improve the accuracy of electoral rolls by identifying duplicate, deceased, shifted or otherwise ineligible entries while ensuring eligible citizens remain registered. In the Bihar case, the Supreme Court accepted that maintaining accurate rolls is a legitimate objective and upheld the Commission’s legal power to conduct that SIR, subject to safeguards for notice, inclusion and appeal.

The practical impact can nevertheless be significant. A large verification exercise can require millions of voters to confirm details or provide documents; names may be omitted from a draft roll and later restored; election officials face a heavy administrative burden; and errors can matter greatly if they are not corrected before polling. During the 2026 nationwide exercise, reports of large numbers of names missing from draft rolls, software and Form 6 problems, and later corrective drives intensified scrutiny of the process.

The government/BJP position and the Election Commission’s position should not be merged. The ECI says SIR is an administrative exercise to clean and update voter lists. BJP leaders have defended the need for accurate rolls and rejected allegations that the exercise is designed to benefit the ruling party. There is no verified basis for Dishantra to state a hidden government “intention” as fact.

The opposition’s interpretation is very different. Congress and several other opposition parties allege that the way SIR has been implemented has removed or burdened legitimate voters and could alter electoral competition in favour of the BJP. They have demanded reversal or stronger safeguards, challenged aspects of the process in court, sought the CEC’s resignation/removal and joined public protests. Those are political and legal allegations; they are not equivalent to a final judicial finding that SIR was designed to manipulate an election.

The central issue for voters is therefore practical as well as political: is the roll more accurate after revision, and can every eligible citizen who is wrongly excluded get restored through a clear, timely and workable process before voting takes place?

12. The current 2026 situation: electoral rolls, Form 6, internal decision-making and judicial scrutiny

The most significant current controversy concerns the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls and the way later nationwide revisions have been implemented.

What the Supreme Court held on the Bihar SIR

In its 27 May 2026 judgment concerning Bihar, the Supreme Court upheld the legal basis of the SIR under Article 324 read with the Representation of the People Act, while stressing procedural safeguards. The judgment recorded the competing constitutional concerns: eligible citizens must not be excluded, but rolls must also remain accurate.

The Court’s judgment dealt with the Bihar exercise. It does not mean that every later software change, form modification, deletion or implementation decision in a nationwide SIR is automatically lawful. Those later acts remain reviewable on their own facts and legal basis.

What changed in late 2026

By September and October 2026, reporting and litigation raised questions about:

Reuters reported on 26 September that the ECI ordered a review of voter-roll software after concerns were raised and announced corrective measures, including direct assistance to voters with flagged discrepancies.

Allegations of unilateral decision-making

Petitions before the Supreme Court allege that CEC Gyanesh Kumar took important decisions without the required concurrence or majority of the other two Election Commissioners. Reporting has referred to repeated internal objections by Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi.

The ECI has disputed the interpretation that these internal differences prove unlawful or partisan functioning and has maintained that its processes are lawful.

On 5 October 2026 the Supreme Court issued notices in proceedings concerning the CEC’s functioning and the Commission’s decision-making process. It declined to grant interim suspension of the CEC at that stage. The Court indicated that it would examine the record and could annul decisions if they were shown to be contrary to law.

Form 6 controversy

A separate controversy concerns changes/declarations associated with Form 6, which is used for new voter registration. Petitioners allege that modifications were introduced without the required statutory process.

On 6 October 2026, the Chief Justice of India clarified in court that the Supreme Court had not approved a modified Form 6 in the broad manner being suggested. The Court is examining who authorised disputed changes and what legal basis existed for them.

This remains pending litigation. It would be inaccurate to state that the Court has already found the CEC personally guilty of illegal manipulation.

What the opposition is saying

Opposition criticism now operates on several levels:

These are political and legal allegations. The ECI and BJP deny partisan manipulation.

What civil society is saying and doing

Civil-society reaction is not one uniform position, but concern has widened beyond party statements.

What the ECI says

The ECI’s stated position is that electoral rolls must be accurate and that duplicate, deceased, shifted or otherwise ineligible entries cannot simply be left untouched. It defends intensive revision as a lawful tool and has announced reviews/corrections where implementation concerns have arisen.

The Commission has also emphasised that internal disagreement does not automatically establish dysfunction or bias.

The current controversy therefore has three different layers that should not be collapsed into one:

  1. legal design questions — appointment and immunity;
  2. administrative legality questions — forms, software, deletion/re-enrolment and collective decision-making;
  3. political trust questions — whether citizens and parties perceive the institution as neutral.

As of 6 October 2026, the newest allegations remain under judicial scrutiny. They are not final judicial findings that the CEC or ECI manipulated an election.

13. What role does the government have — and what role does it not have?

The Union government has a substantial role in the appointment process under the 2023 Act.

The Law Minister heads the Search Committee. The Prime Minister chairs the Selection Committee. A Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister is another member. The third member is the Leader of Opposition. The President then makes the formal appointment.

But once appointed, the Election Commission is not constitutionally a department under the Union government. Its election-management powers arise from Article 324 and election law.

The executive also cannot lawfully instruct the Commission to favour a political party in the conduct of elections.

The constitutional concern is therefore not that “the government runs the Election Commission” in a simple administrative sense. The real debate is subtler: does an appointment process in which the executive has two of three selection votes create too much influence over who enters an institution that must later regulate elections involving that same executive’s political party?

That is the question currently before the courts and the public. It should be addressed through law, evidence and institutional design rather than partisan assumption.

14. How should a citizen judge the Election Commission?

Instead of beginning with “Is the ECI pro-government or anti-government?”, a more useful test is to ask observable questions:

  1. Are eligible citizens able to get onto and remain on the electoral roll through a clear, lawful process?
  2. Are deletions and corrections traceable, reasoned and open to claims or appeal?
  3. Are election rules and the Model Code applied consistently across parties?
  4. Are EVM/VVPAT and counting procedures verifiable and auditable?
  5. Are Commission decisions genuinely collegial where the law requires collective decision-making?
  6. Are reasons, data and procedural changes disclosed clearly enough for public scrutiny?
  7. Can courts review disputed decisions effectively and in time?
  8. Does the appointment system create both actual independence and public confidence in independence?

Those questions allow citizens to examine evidence without assuming either that every criticism is proof of bias or that constitutional status makes the institution immune from criticism.

Conclusion

The Election Commission of India is one of the central constitutional institutions of Indian democracy. Its authority has expanded and its methods have evolved — from ballot boxes to EVMs and VVPATs, from a single-member commission to a three-member collegial body, and from paper-heavy administration to digital electoral-roll and complaint systems.

But technological and administrative evolution does not remove the central constitutional challenge: the referee of elections must be trusted by people who disagree sharply about politics.

India’s Constitution gives the ECI independence and substantial power. Election laws, courts and internal procedures place limits around that power. The current debate over the CEC appointment process and the 2026 electoral-roll revisions shows why both dimensions matter.

The strongest way to assess the Election Commission is neither automatic trust nor automatic suspicion. It is to examine the law, the process, the evidence, the Commission’s explanations, and the findings of independent courts — and to keep allegations clearly separate from established facts.

Sources and references

The sources below support the constitutional, legal, institutional and current-affairs material in this article. Primary sources are listed first. Current reporting is used only for developments where proceedings are active or the primary record is incomplete.

Primary constitutional, statutory and institutional sources

  1. Constitution of India — especially Articles 124(4), 324 and 361. Legislative Department, Government of India.
    https://www.legislative.gov.in/static/uploads/2025/08/7af1daa22d65f9d04c00ae9b9aa5a799.pdf
    Used for: constitutional status of the ECI; appointment framework; removal protection; comparison with presidential immunity.

  2. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 — especially sections 4–11, 16, 17 and 18. India Code.
    https://upload.indiacode.nic.in/view-casepdf?id=AC_CEN_3_20_00080_A2023-49_1704690560714&type=act
    Used for: current appointment procedure, Search Committee, Selection Committee, tenure, removal, protection under section 16 and transaction of business.

  3. The Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 — section 3. India Code.
    https://www.indiacode.nic.in/indiacode/handle/123456789/1858?view_type=browse
    Used for: comparison between section 16 protection for CECs/ECs and functional protection available to serving and former judges.

  4. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 — especially section 3. India Code.
    https://www.indiacode.nic.in/indiacode/handle/123456789/1539?view_type=browse
    Used for: 100-Lok-Sabha-member / 50-Rajya-Sabha-member notice thresholds and the inquiry procedure relevant to removal of a CEC.

  5. Election Commission of India — About ECI.
    https://www.eci.gov.in/about-eci/
    Used for: constitutional role, functions, advisory/quasi-judicial work and institutional background.

  6. Election Commission of India — Hon’ble Commission / Officers Directory.
    https://www.eci.gov.in/honble-commission/
    https://www.eci.gov.in/officers-directory
    Used for: current composition of the Commission and dates of assumption of office.

  7. Election Commission of India — EVM/VVPAT.
    https://www.eci.gov.in/evm-vvpat
    Used for: evolution and operation of EVM/VVPAT and ECI’s legal-history material.

  8. Election Commission of India — Model Code of Conduct.
    https://www.eci.gov.in/mcc
    Used for: scope and operation of the MCC and obligations of parties/candidates.

  9. Election Commission of India — ECI Publications / Atlas, General Election to Lok Sabha 2024.
    https://www.eci.gov.in/eci-publication/
    Used for: scale of the 2024 Lok Sabha election, electors and polling-station context.

  10. Election Commission of India — General Elections / SIR-2026 material.
    https://www.eci.gov.in/general-elections
    Used for: current election-management and electoral-roll context.

Supreme Court judgments and orders

  1. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, Supreme Court of India, 2 March 2023.
    https://webapi.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2015/1458/1458_2015_3_1501_42634_Judgement_02-Mar-2023.pdf
    Used for: pre-2023 executive-dominated appointment history, institutional-independence reasoning, reform-history discussion and the interim PM–LoP–CJI selection mechanism.

  2. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, Supreme Court of India, 26 April 2024 (VVPAT/EVM judgment).
    https://webapi.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/10857/10857_2023_2_1501_52646_Judgement_26-Apr-2024.pdf
    Used for: EVM/VVPAT verification, rejection of return-to-paper-ballot / 100% VVPAT-counting prayers, and additional verification safeguards.

  3. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, Supreme Court of India, 27 May 2026, 2026 INSC 564 (Bihar SIR).
    https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2025/35785/35785_2025_1_1501_71617_Judgement_27-May-2026.pdf
    Used for: legal basis and safeguards concerning Bihar’s Special Intensive Revision, and the figures recorded by the Court.

  4. Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India and connected cases, Supreme Court of India, 23 September 2026.
    https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93502591/
    Used for: split opinions on whether the challenge to the 2023 appointment law required a Constitution Bench and the direction placing the matter before the Chief Justice of India.

Current appointments, parliamentary action and live legal disputes

  1. Indian Express, 17–18 February 2025 — appointment of Gyanesh Kumar as CEC and Rahul Gandhi’s dissent.
    https://indianexpress.com/article/india/chief-election-commissioner-selection-committee-meeting-pm-modi-rahul-gandhi-amit-shah-9841211/
    Used for: first CEC selection under the new statutory process and the recorded opposition dissent.

  2. Indian Express, 6–7 April 2026 — rejection of opposition removal notices against CEC Gyanesh Kumar.
    https://indianexpress.com/article/india/rajya-sabha-chairman-cp-radhakrishnan-rejected-opposition-motion-remove-cec-gyanesh-kumar-10622419/
    Used for: March 2026 notices, 130/63 signatures and refusal of admission by the presiding officers.

  3. Indian Express, 24–25 April 2026 — fresh Rajya Sabha removal notice backed by 73 MPs.
    https://indianexpress.com/article/india/cec-removal-notice-gyanesh-kumar-opposition-rajya-sabha-10653759/
    Used for: subsequent removal attempt and opposition allegations, which are presented as allegations rather than findings.

  4. LiveLaw, 12 January 2026 — Supreme Court notice in Lok Prahari challenge to section 16 immunity.
    https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-to-hear-plea-challenging-lifelong-immunity-given-to-chief-election-commissioner-election-commissioners-518585
    Used for: pending constitutional challenge to section 16 and the Court’s refusal to stay the provision at that stage.

  5. Indian Express, 5–6 October 2026 — Supreme Court proceedings concerning alleged unilateral ECI decisions and Form 6.
    https://indianexpress.com/article/legal-news/supreme-court-election-commission-of-india-gyanesh-kumar-notice-10908179/
    https://indianexpress.com/article/legal-news/surya-kant-modifications-form-6-not-approved-supreme-court-10907367/
    Used for: notice issued by the Court, its statement that it had not approved the disputed Form 6 modifications, and the fact that the allegations remain under adjudication.

  6. Indian Express, 23–24 September 2026 — opposition plans for fresh removal proceedings following reports of internal ECI objections.
    https://indianexpress.com/article/india/opposition-to-move-impeachment-motion-against-cec-gyanesh-kumar-india-bloc-chief-election-commissioner-10892276/
    Used for: current opposition position and ECI’s explanation that internal notes and suggestions form part of standard decision-making processes.

Current civil-society and protest reporting

  1. Reuters, 3 October 2026 — protests over voter-roll changes.
    https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-police-detain-several-people-gen-z-led-protests-against-voter-roll-2026-10-03/
    Used for: scale and character of youth/civic protests and ECI’s defence of roll revision.

  2. Reuters, 4 October 2026 — protests demanding the CEC’s resignation.
    https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/protests-demanding-indian-election-chief-resigns-escalate-2026-10-04/
    Used for: continuing protest activity, opposition allegations and denials by the ECI/BJP.

  3. Reuters, 6 October 2026 — opposition protest march in Delhi.
    https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/hundreds-police-guard-indian-capital-ahead-opposition-protest-2026-10-06/
    Used for: the current 6 October 2026 protest situation and the distinction between allegations and established findings.

Publication note on live issues

The appointment-law challenge, the section 16 challenge, the Form 6/collegial-decision proceedings and nationwide SIR-related disputes are active matters. Their status must be rechecked immediately before publication. Any later Supreme Court order, ECI clarification, statutory change or verified correction should replace the dated position stated in this draft.

Prepared with AI-assisted research and writing. Primary legal and institutional sources are prioritised; active political allegations are attributed and not treated as established findings. Editorial standards · Corrections & support

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