Global Affairs & Diplomacy · 11 min read

BRICS in 2026: Members, India’s Role and What the New Delhi Summit Changed

By Dishantra Editorial · Published 13 September 2026 · Reviewed 8 October 2026

BRICS is now a much larger forum than the original five-country grouping, but expansion has not turned it into a single political or economic bloc. The useful question is not whether BRICS is “rising” or “replacing” another institution. It is what its members have actually agreed to do, where their interests overlap, and which headline claims go beyond the evidence.

Primary source trail: PIB 2026 BRICS backgrounder · New Delhi Declaration · NDB at the 18th Summit

The short answer

As of October 2026, BRICS has 11 members: Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates. The 18th BRICS Summit was held in New Delhi on 12–13 September under India’s chairship. The leaders adopted the New Delhi Declaration, which covers global-governance reform, trade, finance, payments, technology, climate, security, health, education and people-to-people cooperation.

Three distinctions make the 2026 picture easier to understand. First, BRICS is a forum for coordination by sovereign states, not a supranational government. Second, BRICS membership is not the same thing as membership of the New Development Bank. Third, discussion of local-currency settlement and cross-border payment links is not evidence that BRICS has created or agreed to create a common currency.

The 2026 summit therefore matters, but mainly as a map of shared priorities and workstreams. A declaration can establish political agreement; it does not by itself prove implementation.

1. What BRICS is — and what it is not

The term “BRIC” began as an economic label for Brazil, Russia, India and China. Political cooperation among the four governments developed later, with ministerial engagement from 2006 and the first leaders’ summit in 2009. South Africa joined the grouping in 2011, turning BRIC into BRICS.

The most important recent change is expansion. The 2026 Government of India backgrounder lists 11 members, reflecting the addition of major economies from the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. The New Delhi Declaration also recognises a separate category of Partner countries. That matters because headlines sometimes mix members, partners and countries seeking closer relations as though they have identical status.

BRICS does not operate like the European Union. It does not have a supranational executive that can legislate for member states, and the 2026 declaration again emphasises sovereign equality and consensus. Nor is it a military alliance. Its cooperation is organised around three broad pillars: political and security cooperation; economic and financial cooperation; and cultural and people-to-people cooperation.

This loose structure is both a strength and a limitation. It allows countries with different political systems, alliances and strategic interests to cooperate on selected issues. But it also means that a BRICS declaration should not be read as evidence that all members will pursue identical national policies.

2. Why expansion changes the organisation

An 11-member BRICS has more geographic reach, a wider range of energy producers and consumers, and a larger set of development priorities than the original grouping. That can increase its bargaining weight in debates about international institutions. It also makes consensus harder.

Brazil, India, China and Russia do not approach every security, trade or diplomatic question in the same way. The newer members bring their own regional relationships and economic structures. Expansion therefore increases both the potential value of coordination and the number of interests that must be reconciled.

A useful way to judge the expanded grouping is to ask whether it can convert broad language into institutions, standards, financing, recurring working groups or measurable programmes. The New Development Bank is one example of a durable institution. A summit statement without a delivery mechanism is a different category of outcome.

3. India’s 2026 chairship: what it tried to organise

India chaired BRICS in 2026 under the theme “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” The final New Delhi Declaration records that more than 400 meetings and engagements were convened in 30 cities across India during the chairship.

The four words in the theme were not merely branding. They framed work on resilient infrastructure and supply chains, emerging technologies, development cooperation, sustainability, finance and institutional reform. India also used the chairship to emphasise what it described as a people-centric and Global South-oriented approach.

The summit itself is only the most visible part of a chairship. Trade ministers, finance officials, central banks, working groups and other sectoral bodies meet before leaders adopt final language. For example, ministerial meetings worked on the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2030, MSME finance and resilient global value chains. That is why the best way to read a summit is to connect the leaders’ declaration to the workstreams underneath it.

4. What the New Delhi Declaration actually says

The New Delhi Declaration is long because BRICS now covers many policy areas. Its most important value is not that every paragraph creates a new programme; it is that the document shows where all members were willing to reach consensus in September 2026.

Global governance and the United Nations

BRICS continued to call for a more representative multilateral system and greater voice for developing countries. On UN Security Council reform, the declaration records support for a larger role for the Global South and notes that China and Russia reiterated support for the aspirations of Brazil and India to play a greater role in the UN, including the Security Council.

This is politically significant, but it is not the same as an agreed UN reform package. Changes to the Security Council require processes far beyond BRICS.

Trade and the WTO

The declaration supports a rules-based multilateral trading system and calls for reform of the World Trade Organization, including restoration of a functioning two-tier dispute-settlement mechanism. It also criticises trade-restrictive measures that members regard as inconsistent with WTO rules.

Here again, BRICS can coordinate positions, but it cannot itself change WTO law. Implementation depends on negotiations involving the wider WTO membership.

Security and counter-terrorism

The declaration condemns terrorism in all forms and calls for cooperation against terrorist financing, safe havens and cross-border movement of terrorists. It also refers to the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group. The existence of a working group makes this more than a one-off sentence, but national security policy remains with member governments.

5. The currency question: local settlement is not a BRICS currency

This is one of the areas where headlines most often outrun the source documents.

The 2026 declaration acknowledges work by the BRICS Payment Task Force on more efficient cross-border payment mechanisms. It refers to studying interoperability between payment and messaging channels and to discussions on trade settlement and investment using BRICS members’ local currencies. Importantly, the declaration also says national priorities differ and there is no one-size-fits-all approach.

That is not the same as announcing a shared BRICS currency.

Four ideas should be kept separate:

• Local-currency settlement: two parties settle a transaction in one of their national currencies rather than a third currency.
• Payment-system interoperability: technical or institutional arrangements make cross-border payments easier.
• Reserve diversification: a central bank or institution changes the composition of assets it holds.
• A common currency: participating countries create or adopt a shared monetary unit with much deeper governance implications.

Evidence that BRICS is discussing the first two does not prove the fourth. This distinction will be the focus of a separate Dishantra explainer because “BRICS currency” is too broad a label for several different policy questions.

6. The New Development Bank: the most concrete BRICS institution

The New Development Bank was established in 2015 to mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable-development projects in emerging markets and developing countries. It is often described as the BRICS bank, but its legal membership and BRICS political membership should not be treated as identical. In September 2026, the NDB said its own membership base stood at ten countries, while official sources listed 11 BRICS members.

The New Delhi Declaration supports further expansion of NDB membership and highlights the launch of the BRICS–NDB Knowledge Portal. Separately, the NDB’s Board of Governors approved its General Strategy for 2027–2031 in September 2026.

This is a good example of the difference between an institution and a summit promise. The NDB has governance bodies, strategies, financing operations and projects that can be tracked over time. Its performance should therefore be judged through financing, project outcomes, risk management and transparency — not simply by the political symbolism of BRICS expansion.

7. Technology, AI and digital cooperation

The 2026 declaration gives artificial intelligence and digital technology a substantial place. It refers to AI in health, energy systems, industry, finance, education and the green economy, and commits members to work on the BRICS Leaders’ Statement on the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence.

For readers, the key distinction is between shared principles and shared regulation. BRICS countries can agree that AI governance, digital security and capacity building matter without adopting one binding regulatory regime. National laws, data rules, industrial strategies and security policies can still differ sharply.

The same caution applies to digital payments. Technical cooperation can be meaningful even when it falls far short of monetary integration.

8. Climate, resilience and development finance

Climate and resilience were central to India’s 2026 theme. The declaration discusses climate finance, resilient infrastructure, carbon markets, community-based adaptation and the role of traditional and local knowledge. It also criticises certain unilateral carbon-border measures that members view as unfair to developing economies.

These positions reflect a recurring BRICS argument: developing countries need greater policy space, finance and representation when global rules are designed. But the members themselves have different energy systems, fiscal capacities and climate pathways. “BRICS position” therefore describes negotiated common language, not identical domestic policy.

9. What BRICS means for India

For India, BRICS serves several purposes at once.

• First, representation. India uses BRICS to press for reform of global institutions and a stronger voice for developing countries.
• Second, strategic flexibility. BRICS gives India another forum in which it can work with countries that do not all belong to the same Western-led or regional institutions. Participation does not require India to treat every member as an ally or to adopt every member’s geopolitical position.
• Third, economic cooperation. Trade, development finance, payments, technology, energy and resilient supply chains create practical areas for engagement.
• Fourth, Global South diplomacy. India’s 2026 chairship repeatedly framed BRICS as a platform through which emerging and developing economies can influence rule-making rather than only respond to rules made elsewhere.

There are limits. India also has bilateral disputes and strategic differences with some BRICS members. It participates in other groupings with different memberships and purposes. A serious analysis therefore should not force India’s foreign policy into a binary choice between “BRICS” and “the West”.

10. Is BRICS trying to replace the G7, G20, IMF or the dollar?

Those comparisons are attractive because they produce a simple geopolitical story. They are usually too crude.

• G7 is a small grouping of advanced democracies.
• G20 includes major advanced and emerging economies and has a different role in global economic coordination.
• IMF and World Bank are treaty-based financial institutions with formal governance and lending functions.
• US dollar is a national currency with a global role shaped by financial markets, trade, reserves and institutions.

BRICS overlaps with parts of each debate — representation, finance, trade and payments — but it is not structurally equivalent to any one of them. The New Delhi Declaration itself calls for reform of existing multilateral institutions rather than declaring that BRICS has replaced them.

The more defensible conclusion is that BRICS is trying to increase the collective influence and practical cooperation of its members within a more multipolar system. Whether that produces durable institutional change has to be measured issue by issue.

11. A practical test for any BRICS headline

When a claim about BRICS appears in the news, five questions help separate an actual development from an interpretation:

1. Was it agreed by leaders, proposed by one member, or reported by a commentator?
2. Is there an official document? A declaration, ministerial outcome or institutional decision is stronger evidence than a speech fragment.
3. Who has authority to implement it? BRICS, the NDB, a national government, a central bank, the WTO and the UN are different institutions.
4. Is there a timetable, financing mechanism or operating body? These make implementation more observable.
5. What would count as evidence that it happened? A payment link, approved project, legal change, membership decision or published data is more useful than repeated rhetoric.

This method is especially useful for claims about a common currency, de-dollarisation, new members, trade blocs and geopolitical alignment.

12. What to watch after the 2026 summit

The New Delhi summit created a useful baseline for the next phase of BRICS. The most consequential follow-through will be visible in a few areas: implementation of payment-system work; progress on the Economic Partnership Strategy 2030; NDB membership and financing; the practical use of the BRICS–NDB Knowledge Portal; AI-governance cooperation; and whether common positions translate into wider negotiations at the UN, WTO and other institutions.

Membership also deserves careful tracking. Expansion increases reach, but every additional member changes the internal balance and makes consensus more complex. Partner-country relationships add another layer that should not be confused with full membership.

Finally, India’s 2026 chairship should be judged not only by the summit declaration but by what survives after the chair rotates: recurring programmes, institutions, finance, standards, working groups and measurable outcomes.

Conclusion

BRICS is larger, more institutionally active and more politically visible than the grouping that emerged from the original BRIC idea. India’s chairship culminated in a New Delhi Declaration covering a very broad agenda, from global-governance reform and trade to payments, AI, climate and security.

But breadth should not be mistaken for uniformity. BRICS remains a consensus-based forum of sovereign states with different interests. Its most important developments are the ones that can be traced from declaration to mechanism to implementation.

That is also the best way to read the next BRICS headline: identify what was actually agreed, who can implement it, and what evidence would show that the promise became real.

Sources & editorial note

• Press Information Bureau: BRICS — Evolution, Cooperation and India’s Leadership, 10 September 2026 — primary source for chronology, India’s chairship theme and the 11-member list.
• BRICS New Delhi Declaration, 12 September 2026 — primary source for agreed leaders’ language on governance, trade, payments, local currencies, security, AI, climate and the NDB.
• Prime Minister’s opening remarks, 12 September 2026 — primary source for India’s chairship priorities.
• 16th BRICS Trade Ministers’ Meeting, Jaipur, 7 August 2026 — primary source for the Economic Partnership Strategy 2030 work, MSME finance and trade priorities.
• New Development Bank at the 18th BRICS Summit — institutional source for the NDB’s role and the BRICS–NDB Knowledge Portal.
• NDB General Strategy 2027–2031 approval, September 2026 — institutional source for the bank’s current membership count and strategy.

This article is an original Dishantra synthesis. It distinguishes agreed declaration language from interpretation and implementation. It does not treat local-currency settlement as proof of a common BRICS currency, does not treat partner-country status as full membership, and does not infer that all BRICS members share one geopolitical position.

Prepared with AI-assisted research and writing. Primary official and institutional sources were rechecked on 8 October 2026. No independent expert review is claimed. Editorial standards · Corrections & support